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Abstract—Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) networks have emerged as a 
new communication paradigm between Electric Vehicles (EVs) 
and the Smart Grid (SG). To ensure seamless communications 
between mobile EVs and the electric vehicle supply equipment, the 
support of ubiquitous and transparent mobile IP communications 
is essential in V2G networks. However, enabling mobile IP 
communications raise real concerns about the possibility of 
tracking the locations of connected EVs through their mobile IP 
addresses. In this paper, we employ certificate-less public key 
cryptography in synergy with the restrictive partially blind 
signature technique to construct a secure and privacy-aware 
proxy mobile IPv6 protocol that addresses the location privacy 
concerns of EVs. Our proposed protocol ensures the session 
continuity between an EV and the charging services while 
protecting the identity and location privacy of the EV. We assess 
the feasibility of the proposed protocol in terms of the information-
theoretic uncertainty derived by the mutual information metric 
between mobile EVs and their network registration domains and 
show the high levels of achieved anonymity.  
Keywords—EV; Privacy-aware; Proxy Mobile IPv6; Security; 
Smart Grid; V2G 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In parallel with the rapid growth of smart grid (SG) 
deployments, transportation electrification is one of the major 
SG-related applications aiming at reducing carbon emissions 
thus achieving sustainable transportation systems. This has 
stimulated the development of electric transportation 
technologies such as electric vehicles (EVs). With the massive 
number it is anticipated to reach, e.g., up to 10 million EVs on 
the US roads by 2025 [1], an intelligent management of EV 
charging loads is envisioned to act as a vital capability for the 
SG for preventing any overloads initiated at local sub-stations. 
From the EV users’ perspective, the electric vehicle supply 
equipment (EVSE), i.e., charging spots, should be widely 
available and easy to reach. Therefore, a variety of residential 
and public charging spots with different charging capabilities 
should be available for EVs to use in future V2G networks. 
The current standardisation activities ISO/IEC 15118 [2] and 
SAE J2836 [3] specify the communication interface between 
EVs and EVSEs in V2G networks. According to the ISO/IEC 
15118-2 standard, the IPv6 protocol is adopted as mandatory to 
acquire an IP address at the network layer and carry out TCP/IP 
communications [4]. Thus, the IP connection is utilised to 
exchange information during the charging process and for value 
added services [2]. Given the realistic fact that a full EV charge 
could be initiated at different geographical locations, the SG 
operator or the mobility operator should be able to keep track of 
the mobile EV and route it to a suitable charging spot. Therefore, 
it is quite critical to maintain seamless communications between 
EVs and EVSEs. Using different access technologies such as 
Power Line Communications (PLC), which is supported by 
ISO/IEC 15118-3, and WLAN, LTE that are expected to be 
supported by the currently under development ISO/IEC 15118-
6 standard [5], EVs will communicate with the charging 
infrastructure in different contexts to 1) initiate the charging 
session, 2) negotiate and access the information required for the 
next charging/discharging schedule, and 3) terminate the 
charging session and receive the billing information.  
The support of ubiquitous and transparent mobile IP 
communications is essential in V2G networks in order to 
maintain the service context between the SG operator and EVs. 
However, once a two-way communication between an EV and 
EVSE is established, there is no technical limitation to the 
amount and type of data that could be obtained from the EV such 
as its GPS location, the number of kms indicated on its odometer, 
as well as driver-oriented personal data such as the length of 
time the EV air conditioning was on [6]. For instance, if the 
DVD player was on in the backseat, it is highly likely that there 
is more than one person in the EV and one of them is possibly a 
child. In fact, exposing EV users’ privacy and tracking and/or 
profiling them is very easy using their mobile IP addresses. 
A handful of studies has addressed anonymous and privacy-
preserving communications in V2G networks after establishing 
an IP connection (see [7-9]). All aspects of authentication, 
authorisation, and billing are initialised via the communication 
protocol once the IP connection is established [10]. However, to 
the best of our knowledge, no previous work has addressed the 
security and privacy concerns of mobile IP in V2G networks in 
order to prevent tracking/profiling of EVs using their mobile IP 
addresses. In [11], Nguyen et al. have suggested Proxy Mobile 
IPv6 (PMIPv6) protocol for V2G networks. PMIPv6 is a 
network-based localised mobility management protocol that can 
support the mobility of an EV without its involvement [12]. 
Thus, it allows the EV to use the same IPv6 address while 
moving within the PMIPv6 domain. It also decreases the 
signalling overhead and has lower handoff latency than host-
based protocols such as Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) [13]. Finally, 
there is no need to modify the EV protocol stack to join PMIPv6 
network. Thus, PMIPv6 makes a good candidate for V2G 
networks. Nonetheless, PMIPv6 suffers from many security and 
privacy threats such as impersonation, man in the middle, and 
location tracking attacks. Moreover, it has a long authentication 
latency during handoffs as explained later in Section II-A. 
To rectify the above problems, in this paper, we propose a 
secure and privacy-aware PMIPv6 protocol for V2G networks. 
The focus of this paper is the security and privacy issues related 
to mobile IP at the network layer. With the employment of 
certificate-less cryptography in synergy with the restrictive 
partially blind signature (RPBS) technique, the novel 
contribution of this paper is two folds. First, the proposed 
protocol reduces significantly the authentication overhead in 
PMIPv6 by introducing the pass authentication. Thus, it 
guarantees a seamless handover with minimum authentication 
delay. Secondly, it provides a strong location privacy for the EV 
against attempts to track its location in the PMIPv6 domain.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II 
states the preliminaries we will utilise in our scheme whereas 
Section III is dedicated at describing the V2G network scenario 
and the security goals. Section IV introduces the proposed 
secure and privacy-aware PMIPv6 protocol. Section V provides 
the analysis and evaluation of the proposed protocol in terms of 
its security and privacy-preserving capabilities whereas Section 
VI strengthens the benefits of our scheme under a brief 
comparison with related work. Finally, Section VII concludes 
the paper and discuss on future work. 
II. PRELIMINARIES 
A. PMIPv6 Protocol Operations in V2G Networks 
The PMIPv6 protocol introduces the following network 
entities to handle the EV mobility within a PMIPv6 local 
mobility domain (LMD). The Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) 
that maintains a binding cache entry for tracking the locations of 
each mobile EV and directing its traffic towards its current 
topological location. The Mobile Access Gateway (MAG) that 
is responsible for performing the mobility-related signalling 
with the LMA on behalf of an EV. Finally, the Authentication, 
Authorisation and Accounting (AAA) Server that is responsible 
for authenticating an EV to ensure that it is allowed to access the 
LMD. Fig. 1 shows the PMIPv6 signalling flow. 
 
Fig. 1. PMIPv6 Signalling Flow 
According to Fig. 1, when an EV joins a LMD, it sends a 
Router Solicitation (RS) message to attach to a MAG in the 
LMD, which we denote by MAG1, that authenticates the EV by 
using its identifier EV_ID, which was included in RS message, 
to request authentication by the AAA server. In the scenario of 
a successful authorisation for joining the LMD, MAG1 sends a 
Proxy Binding Update (PBU) message to the LMA that contains 
EV_ID. The LMA updates its binding cache entries and sends a 
Proxy binding Acknowledgment (PBA) to MAG1 that contains 
the Home Network Prefix (HNP), and subsequently establishes 
a bidirectional tunnel to MAG1. Finally, MAG1 sends a Router 
Advertisement (RA) message to the EV that contains the HNP. 
Upon receiving the RA message, the EV configures its IPv6 
address to communicate with the corresponding node (CN). 
When the EV performs a handover, from MAG1 to MAG2, 
MAG1 and the LMA exchange De-PBU and De-PBA messages 
to update the LMA’s binding entries. Subsequently MAG2 
authenticates the EV again as explained before and updates the 
current location of the EV at LMA. Finally, it obtains the same 
HNP for the EV so it can continue using the same IPv6 address 
as long as it is moving within the same LMD. 
B. Certificate-less Public Key Cryptography (CL-PKC) 
Let (𝔾1, +) and (𝔾2, .) be two cyclic groups of prime order q 
and the bilinear pairing is a map e : 𝔾1 ×  𝔾2 → 𝔾2 where e(aP, 
bQ) = e(P, Q)ab for all P, Q ∈ 𝔾1 and a, b ∈ ℤ𝑞
∗ . A trusted Key 
Generation Centre (KGC) chooses three random generators P, 
P0, P1 ∈ 𝔾1, three secure hash functions H0: {0, 1}* → 𝔾1, H1: 
{0, 1}* → ℤ𝑞





 and a random master key 
s ∈ ℤ𝑞
∗ . KGC then sets Ppub = sP as its public key and publishes 
the system parameters (𝔾1, 𝔾2, e, q, Ppub, P, P0, P1, H0, H1, H2, 
Enc) where Enc is a symmetric encryption algorithm [14]. 
Each legitimate entity A in the system that has an identity 
IDA, including EVs, MAGs, the LMA and the AAA server, 
sends a request to the KGC that includes its IDA and a secret key 
KA to obtain its partial private key. This request is encrypted 
using Ppub. The KGC then generates a partial private key DA = s 
× QA where QA = H0(IDA), encrypts it using KA, and sends it back 
to A. Upon receipt of DA, A selects a random number xA ∈ ℤ𝑞
∗  
and computes its private key SKA = xADA and its public key PKA 
= (XA, YA) where XA = xAP and YA = xAPpub. Finally, we define g 
= e(P, QA) and y = e(YA, QA) to be used later in the RPBS 
technique. It is noted that in CL-PKC, the entity A does not need 
a certificate from a trusted authority thus saving the computation 
overhead needed for certificate management. 
C. Certificate-less Restrictive Partially Blind Signature 
The blind signature scheme was firstly introduced in [15] to 
enable a requester to obtain a signature on a message M without 
revealing anything about M to the signer. In [16], the restrictive 
blind signature technique is introduced to allow the requester to 
obtain a signature on a message M not known to the signer but 
the choice of M is restricted and must conform to specific rules. 
The partial blind signature (PBS) technique was introduced in 
[17] to allow the signer to produce a signature on M where the 
signature contains common agreed information that stays clearly 
visible despite the blinding process. The restrictive partially 
blinded signature (RPBS) technique is introduced as a PBS that 
also satisfies the property of restrictiveness. In this paper, we 
adopt the CL-RPBS scheme that was introduced in [18].   
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
A. V2G Network Model & Assumptions 
The V2G network model considered in this paper is 
illustrated in Fig. 2. EV1 is mobile and connects to the EVSE 
and the charging infrastructure at different places using different 
access technologies. Thus, a vertical handover will occur when 
necessary that allows EV1 to continue its connection. The 
MAGs, the LMA, and AAA server will be managed by either 
the SG operator or by the mobility operator that handles the 
communications in the SG. The EVSE could be managed by a 
third party such as an EV manufacturer. As shown in Fig. 2, the 
LMA keeps track of the location of EV1 and directs the data 
traffic to the corresponding MAG. MAGs do not maintain 
binding cache entries for the mobile EVs. The CN in Fig. 2 could 
be any entity in the SG charging infrastructure such as the 
central aggregator (CAG), charging and billing server, etc. In 
order to keep the session continuity and preserve the service 
context between EV1 and the CN, EV1 should maintain the 
same IPv6 address while moving. 
 
Fig. 2. PMIPv6-enabled Vehcile-to-Grid Network 
In this paper, we assume that the LMD is a city or a state, 
which represents a local SG. Thus, when EV1 acquires an IPv6 
address, it can retain this address as long as it is moving within 
the LMD, i.e., intra domain handover is always possible. Inter 
domain handover between different LMDs is outside the scope 
of this paper and is left for our future work. Finally, we assume 
that EV1 is equipped with a logical interface to hide the different 
access technologies to the IPv6 stack in order to retain the same 
IPv6 address after the handover [19].  
B. Security Model 
The communication between LMA and MAG is protected 
using IPSec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) in transport 
mode with mandatory integrity protection as required by the 
PMIPv6 standard [12]. The KGC is trusted by all entities in the 
network. Moreover, since CL-PKC scheme is utilised, the KGC 
is not aware of the private key for any entity in the network. 
There is no trust relationship between the EV and the MAGs or 
LMA. Finally, we assume that a pre-shared keys (PSK) are 
distributed for all legitimate entities in the network in a secure 
way.  
C. Security & Performance Requirements 
In order to protect the EV’s privacy and ensure that the LMA 
or other network entities cannot track the locations of a given 
EV while it is communicating with the charging infrastructure, 
we define the following security and performance requirements. 
1) Mutual authentication between the EV and the MAG to 
prevent impersonation attacks and unauthorised access 
to the PMIPv6 domain. 
2) Location and identity privacy for all mobile EVs. No 
entity in the network including the LMA, MAGs or 
adversaries should be able to link the real identity of the 
EV with its location using its acquired mobile IPv6 
address. For instance, as shown in Fig. 2, the LMA is 
able to track the identity and the locations of the 
connected EV.  
3) Low authentication latency during the handover. As can 
be seen in Fig. 1, the AAA server is utilised to 
authenticate an EV every time it joins the LMD or 
performs a handover between two MAGs. The 
authentication latency should be minimised to ensure 
seamless communications between the EV and the SG.  
IV. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
A. Pass Generation  
Each EV that requires to use the SG charging services, i.e., 
join the V2G network, has to register its identity with the AAA 
server and request a pass. The AAA server generates the pass, 
which contains a message M from the EV that is unknown to 
AAA server, and an expiration time  to indicate when the pass 
expires, which stays visible in the pass. We suggest  is taken 
to be 24 hours. It is assumed that the AAA server will not keep 
track of the generated passes for a particular EV. The pass is 
used by an EV to authenticate itself to a MAG every time it 
performs a handover or joins the LMD for which the pass is 
issued. The restrictive partially blind signature technique is used 
to ensure that the MAG cannot link or reveal the real identity of 
an EV when it sees its pass. The steps taken to generate a pass 
for an EV, which is denoted as EV1, are described as follow. 
1) EV1 generates a message M = uAP0 + P1 where uA ∈ ℤ𝑞
∗  
is a random number and is kept secret at EV1. 
Subsequently it sends the following request to the AAA 
server:  EncPSK(IDEV1, M, t1, SigEV(H1(IDEV1 || M || t1))), 
where t1 is the current timestamp and SigEV is the digital 
signature of EV.  
2) We recall that PSK is a pre-shared key that EV1, as a 
legitimate network entity, shares with the AAA server 
which the AAA server relies on to authenticate EV1 and 
validate the received request. The AAA server chooses 
randomly r ∈ ℤ𝑞
∗  and Q ∈ 𝔾1, calculates U = rP, a = e(P, 
Q), b = e(M, Q), z = e(M, SKAAA) and a pair-wise key k1 
= e(SKAAA, QEV1) and sends EncPSK(U, a, b, z, t2, 
HMACk1(U || a || b || z || t2)) back to EV1. Both IDEV1 and 
M will be stored in the AAA server.  
3) Upon message reception, EV1 calculates k1 = e(SKEV1, 
QAAA) and checks the message integrity. Following, EV1 
chooses randomly (c, , u, v, , ) ∈ ℤ𝑞
∗6, and calculates 









, U = QAAA + U + P, c = H2(M, U, A, z, 
a, b) + H1(), c = cu, and sends EncPSK(c, t3, 
HMACk1(c || t3)) to the AAA server.  
4) The AAA server checks the message integrity and 
calculates S1 = Q + cSKAAA and S2 = cDAAA + rH1()Ppub. 
It sends EncPSK(S1, S2, t4, HMACk1(S1 || S2 || t4)) to EV1.  
5) Finally, EV1 checks if the following equations hold e(P, 
S1) = ay
c
 and e(M, S1) = bz
c
. If yes, it calculates S1 = uS1 
+ vQAAA and S2 = S2 + H1()Ppub. The restrictive 
partially blind signature on M and  is (U, z, c, S1, 
S2) and the passEV1 is {(M, ), (U, z, c, S1, S2)}.    
B. Initial Mobility Session 
When EV1 attaches to MAG1, it generates a pseudo identity 
PID1 as follows. PID1 = rAH0(IPEV1) where rA ∈ ℤ𝑞
∗  is a random 
number that is generated every time EV1 attaches to a new MAG 
and IPEV1 is the current obtained IPv6 address of EV1. If IPEV1 
is not available, then it will be taken to be all zeroes. Thus, PID1 
will be different each time EV1 attaches to a new MAG. After 
that, EV1 sends EncPSK(PID1, passEV1, t5, H0(PID1 || passEV1 || 
t5)) within the RS message to MAG1.   
Following the reception of the RS message, MAG1 validates 
it and verifies the passEV1, if it has not expired, as follows: It 
computes A = e(M, QAAA), a = e(P, S1)y-
c and b = e(M, S1) z 
-c. If the following equation holds e(P, S2) = e(H1()U + 
H2(M, U, A, z, a, b )QAAA, Ppub), then the passEV1 is verified 
and EV1 is authenticated. Consequently, MAG1 sends a PBU 
message to the LMA that contains PID1. The LMA creates a 
new binding entry for PID1 and sends back a PBA message to 
MAG1. MAG1 then sends EncPSK(IDMAG, HNP, t6, H0(IDMAG1 || 
HNP || t6)) within the RA message to EV1. Finally, EV1 
validates the received RA message and configures its IPv6 
address as illustrated in Fig. 3. In this way, MAG1 authenticates 
EV1 without communicating with the AAA server. Due to the 
adopted RPBS scheme, MAG1 is not able to reveal the real 
identity of EV1. 
 
Fig. 3. Secure and Privacy-aware PMIPv6 Signalling Flow 
C. Mobility Session Handover 
When EV1 moves to a new location and detaches from 
MAG1 to attach to MAG2 the authentication process is 
performed as described before but with a new pseudo identity 
PID2. In our scheme, we propose to delay the transmission of 
the De-PBU and De-PBA messages, as can be seen in Fig. 3, 
from MAG1 to the LMA by a random value d. The reason for 
that is to avoid the possible linkage between two pseudo 
identities PID1 and PID2 of EV1 at the LMA. Otherwise, the 
LMA will be able to link the deregistered PID1 with the newly 
registered PID2. Table 1 shows the binding entries at the LMA 
after performing the handover. It can be noticed that within d, 
the LMA maintains two entries with different pseudo identities 
for the same vehicle EV1. However, to the LMA it looks like 
they are the identities of two different vehicles.  
TABLE I.  Binding Cache Entries at LMA within d 
ID Prefix MAG 
PID1 Pref1::/46 MAG1 
PID2 Pref1::/46 MAG2 
It is worth noting that within d, the data packets to the EV 
will be sent to MAG1 and MAG2 while the EV is only attached 
to MAG2. This will cause extra resource consumption. 
However, d can be assigned with a very small value. With the 
large numbers of EVs joining and leaving the network, the LMA 
would not be able to link two pseudo identities to the same EV. 
This is further discussed in Section V-A. 
V. SECURITY & PRIVACY ANALYSIS 
This section provides the analysis of the security and privacy 
properties of our proposed protocol in order to verify whether it 
satisfies the security requirements defined in Section III-C.  
Identity and Location Privacy. In order to illustrate this 
property, we answer the following questions.  
 Can the AAA server track the locations of an EV? The 
AAA server does not save the generated pass thus it is 
not aware of when and where the EV will use this pass.  
 Can the MAG reveal the identity of an EV? Due to the 
utilisation of the RPBS technique, the MAG cannot link 
the real identity of EV with the pass even with help from 
the AAA server, which holds the real identity of EV and 
M, especially as the EV generates a new PID each time 
it attaches to a new MAG.  
 Can the adversaries track an EV or reveal its real 
identity? All the authentication messages and PMIPv6 
signalling messages are encrypted using the PSK. 
Besides that, PIDs are used in PMIPv6 control messages 
thus adversaries cannot link the utilised pass with the 
real identity of the EV, even if a pass was obtained by 
an adversary, it would be changed within the next 24 
hours.  
 Can the LMA track the locations of an EV? In fact, the 
real identity of an EV is hidden and PIDs are utilised 
instead. Therefore, the LMA cannot link two PIDs with 
the real identity of an EV.  
In the following, we investigate the ability of the LMA to 
link two PIDs with a particular EV after performing the 
handover between two adjacent MAGs. For this analysis, we 
assume that we only have two MAGs in the network. 
Anonymity Quantification. Let assume N is the set of all EVs 
in the binding cache entry table at the LMA and W is a subset of 
N where 1 ≤ |W| ≤ |N|. The EVs in W are attached to MAGi and 
are highly likely to perform a handover to MAGj where MAGi 
and MAGj are geographically adjacent to each other. Let assume 
that the arrival of new EVs at MAGj follows a Poisson arrival 
process with arrival rate λ. Let X and Y be two discrete random 
variables with marginal probability functions p(x) and p(y), 
respectively. X represents the probability that EV1 with PID1 
detaches from MAGi while Y represents the probability that EV1 
attaches to MAGj with a new PID2 right away, i.e., performs a 
handover.  
It is worth noting that the LMA cannot assign different 
probabilities to the members of W and it only knows about the 
occurred handover after d. In general, the degree of anonymity 






      (1) 
where HM is the maximum entropy of the system and H(Y) 
measures the amount of information the LMA knows about Y. 
However, in our case, the degree of anonymity is not a suitable 
measurement considering that we need to know how much 
knowing X will reduce uncertainty about Y. Therefore, instead 
of d, we use the mutual information (MI) I(Y; X) that measures 
the amount of reduced uncertainty about Y given the realisation 
of X. Hence, it measures how much knowing that EV1 with 
PID1 detaches from MAGi reduces the uncertainty of the LMA 
that EV1 attaches to MAGj with PID2. I(Y; X) can be written as 
I(Y ; X) = H(Y) – H(Y | X)     (2) 
where H(Y | X) is the conditional entropy that measures the 
amount of information needed to describe Y given that the value 











     (3) 
where p(x, y) is the joint probability distribution function of X 
and Y. We define p(x) = 
1
𝑊
 as the probability that EV1 detaches 






 as the probability that EV1 
attaches to MAGj after detaching from MAGi. λt is the average 
number of arrivals per t units. Fig. 4 shows the amount of 
reduction in uncertainty about Y with respect to the size of W 
and the mean arrival rate λ. 
 
Fig. 4. Amount of Reduction in Uncertanity  
 It can be observed in Fig.4 that for the LMA, the amount of 
reduction in uncertainty decreases when both the size of W and 
the arrival rate λ increase. This resulted outcome demonstrates 
that the LMA stays uncertain about whether PID1 and PID2 
belong to EV1 even though the network has only two MAGs. 
Therefore, our proposed protocol ensures high levels of 
anonymity for mobile EVs at the LMA.  
Mutual Authentication. The proposed scheme achieves mutual 
authentication between an EV and the AAA server and between 
the EV and the MAG to which it is attached. At the pass 
generation, the EV sends its IDEV and M to the AAA server. This 
information is encrypted with the PSK the EV shares with the 
AAA server. Thus, the AAA server authenticates the EV and 
saves its information along with M. When it is attached to the 
MAG, the EV is authenticated on two levels. Firstly, it encrypts 
the information within RS with the PSK, which is securely 
delivered to the MAG by the AAA server for use and then 
deletion, so it is authenticated as a legitimate user. Secondly, it 
has a valid pass thus it is authorised to join the LMD. When the 
MAG replies with the RA message that is encrypted using PSK, 
the EV authenticates the MAG as well. 
Stolen pass attack resistance. It should be noted that the AAA 
server does not save the pass it signed for a particular EV. Thus, 
even if the AAA server is compromised, the attacker cannot steal 
the pass. Moreover, all the authentication messages in the 
network are protected by the PSKs and the EV is required to 
obtain a new pass every 24 hours so even if the pass is stolen, it 
can only benefit the adversary to a limited extent.  
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORK 
The security and privacy issues in V2G networks and in 
PMIPv6/MIPv6 networks have been addressed separately in the 
literature. Next, we give a brief overview of some related works.  
Jie et al. [9] propose a secure and efficient authentication 
scheme with privacy preserving for V2G networks. The scheme 
allows the EVSE to authenticate EVs anonymously and manage 
them dynamically. The authentication scheme is based on a 
revocable group signature, vector commitment scheme and an 
ID-based restrictive partially blind signature technique. Each 
entity in the system acquires a pair of public/private keys from 
a trusted authority (TA). The CAG then assigns a permit to each 
eligible EV that allows it to connect to the SG. The permit is 
generated using the RPBS technique. After verifying the permit, 
the local aggregator (LAG) generates a group membership 
certificate for the EV, which allows it to join the V2G network. 
The proposed scheme suffers from the key escrow problem 
inherited from ID-based public key cryptography, i.e., a 
dishonest TA can forge the signature of any entity while the 
entity can also deny its own signature. 
Liu et al. [8] present a role-dependant privacy-preservation 
scheme (ROPS) to achieve secure interaction between an EV 
and the SG. The authors specified three roles in which an EV 
interacts with the SG: energy demand, energy storage and 
energy supply. In each role, the EV has dissimilar security and 
privacy concerns. Therefore, Liu et al. proposed a set of 
interlinked sub protocols to incorporate different privacy 
considerations when EV acts as a customer, storage or a 
generator. The proposed sub protocols utilise the ring signature, 
fair blind signature and proxy re-encryption techniques to 
prevent the LAG from correlating the EV’s real identity with its 
sensitive information. It also depends on a central authority 
(CA) to assign pseudonyms to EVs and LAGs. Considering the 
large number of network entities and pseudonyms the CA has to 
manage, the CA is the bottleneck of the proposed scheme.  
In the context of securing the PMIPv6 protocol, Chaung et 
al. propose a secure password based authentication mechanism 
for seamless handover in PMIPv6 networks called SPAM [13]. 
The mobile node (MN) registers with the AAA server to receive 
the authentication credentials on a smart card. When MN joins 
the LMD, the user inserts the smart card and keys in his identity 
and a password to get the authentication credentials. These 
credentials are utilised to perform a mutual authentication with 
a MAG. Chaung et al. integrate SPAM with a bicasting scheme 
to avoid the packet loss problem while performing the handover. 
The authors assumed that the smart cards are tamper-proof; 
however, most of them are not as shown in [21]. Besides, smart 
cards are vulnerable to loss and/or theft and SPAM is vulnerable 
to password guessing attacks. 
Taha and Shen proposed ALPP; an anonymous and location 
privacy preserving scheme for MIPv6 heterogeneous networks 
[22]. ALPP consists of two sub schemes: anonymous home 
binding update (AHBU) and anonymous return routability 
(ARR) to add anonymity and location privacy to MIPv6 binding 
updates and return routability control messages, respectively. 
The authors combined onion routing and the anonymiser to 
encrypt repeatedly the transmitted messages at each hop to resist 
traffic analysis attacks and increase the achieved location 
privacy of MNs. The ALPP scheme utilised CL-PKC to 
authenticate a MN to its foreign gateway (FG) while preserving 
its anonymity. A FG in ALPP acts as a KGC for an attached MN. 
Although, the utilisation of CL-PKC reduces the computational 
overhead of the certificate management process, onion routing 
is computationally expensive and many studies have shown its 
susceptibility to different entities having some access to large 
fractions of input-output links [23].  
Our paper differs from these studies in that we identify the 
security and privacy challenges of applying PMIPv6 in V2G 
networks and propose a novel solution to address these 
challenges. The utilisation of anonymous credentials for EVs 
while connecting to V2G networks does not address the EVs 
location privacy concerns because they can still be tracked and 
identified through their mobile IP addresses. Therefore, our 
proposed protocol complements the reported works in the 
literature to achieve EV security and privacy. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we investigated the utilisation of PMIPv6 in 
V2G networks and identified the security and privacy concerns 
of EVs in this context. To achieve seamless communications 
between EV and charging services while protecting the identity 
and location privacy of EV, we have proposed a secure and 
privacy-aware PMIPv6 protocol for V2G networks. Our 
proposed solution utilises in synergy the CL-PKC and RPBS 
technique to achieve mutual authentication, identity and location 
privacy, message integrity and reduced authentication latency. 
Moreover, it achieves high levels of anonymity for EVs by 
reducing the amount of uncertainty about the identity of EV at 
the LMA. For future work, we intend to extend the proposed 
protocol for inter domain handover, i.e., across different LMDs. 
Besides that, we will implement the proposed protocol and 
construct a test bed to assess its performance. 
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